This article studies sixteenth-century Spanish colonialism solely through the lens of Foucauldian thought, using In the sixteenth-century Spanish encounter with indigenous cultures, the Crown employed theologians and philosophers to redefine Western views of humanity, law, and property in opposition to, and supremacy over, the uncivilized Other. Using Michel Foucault's historical methods, this article traces this development in three parts: the debate over whether the indigenous were human and how they were to be made rational through labor; changes in the university system that coincided with the absolutization of reason in both international law and modern conceptions of private property; finally, how these forms of control were employed in discipline and governmentality.
Legally the indigenous were declared subjects. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI's Inter Caetera urged the Spaniards to see that "the health of souls be cared for and that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself."
Such innocent depictions did not last. When gold was found on Hispaniola in 1499, Columbus set up the first repartimiento system, replaced by the Crown in 1503 with encomienda, which "commended" large numbers of the indigenous to Spanish overlords for work in the mines. In 1504, Ferdinand assembled civil and canon lawyers at Burgos to determine a legal and moral justification for the "pacification," both in imperium and dominium, or property. Juan López de Palacios Rubios and Matías de Paz concluded that the king's right to the Americas rested on papal dominion. 17 Both writers also appealed to Roman law: the indigenous had never created civil societies, without which there could be no legal property, only open land. 18 The indigenous could be enslaved, but only if captured in a just war, whose causes included violations of natural law such as ius predicandi, prohibiting Christian missionaries from preaching. 19 Licentiate Gregorio claimed the indigenous were Aristotle's natural slaves, moved only by physical desires, not reason. 20 Gonzalo de Oviedo wrote, "Their principal desire is to eat, drink, have sex, wallow in idle luxury, worship idols, and commit bestial obscenities." 21 Juan Gines de Sepúlveda later argued that "war against the Indians is justified because they are barbarous, uncivilized, unteachable, and lacking civil government." 22 Early accounts reported that the natives had none of the political qualities of human beings, particularly private property and the natural family structure. Rather, they practiced sexual promiscuity, sodomy, abortion, and euthanasia. 23 The irrational indigenous Other was rejected in the extermination of villages and appropriation of native food, land, wealth, and labor-slaves were branded in the face, multiple times, like cattle. 24 Within twenty years, the population of Hispaniola dwindled from 250,000 to less than 15,000, as natives fled the conquistadors or died in the mines. Tzvetan Todorov describes the indigenous Other in its dehumanized level as thing:
Their flesh is used to feed the surviving Indians or even the dogs; they are killed in order to be boiled down for grease, supposed to cure the wounds of the Spaniards: thereby they are identified with animals for the slaughterhouse; all their extremities are cut off . . . transforming them into shapeless trunks, as one might trim a tree. 25 This rejection of the indigenous as Other was soon followed by their cultural return, as humans possessing rational faculties. The first Dominicans arrived in the Indies in 1510 and challenged the encomenderos. In what the Crown viewed as a threat to its claims to dominium, Antonio de Montesinos and Bartolomé de Las Casas argued for the rationality and hence natural law freedoms of the indigenous, who clearly possessed order and civil government. The architectural and engineering feats in Tenochtitlán were undeniably the work of intelligent beings. Montesinos preached, "Are these not men? Have they not rational souls? Are you not bound to love them as you love yourselves?" 26 Ferdinand convened a council at Burgos in 1512 to determine whether the indigenous must be enslaved. The council concluded that the origin of their depraved state was a lack of education, later called "invincible ignorance": 27 unlike children and madmen, they were free, hence capable of reason, morality, and politics, but having no knowledge of God, they failed to exercise reason. As humans in need of guidance, their primitive nature must be educated to what Foucault called "naturalness"-nature as subjected to a sovereign order. 28 The Crown began to erect a territorial grid-Silvio Zavala called it the "warp and woof that later would constitute the very essence of . . . Mexico"-that exercised far greater control than the Aztec Empire. 29 Legally, the indigenous, given in encomienda, would not be chattel slaves, but they needed to demonstrate, via industry, their rationality, their capacity for freedom.
Friar Bernardo de Mesa argued that the natives' greatest vice was their idleness: The King must restrain "their vicious inclinations and compel them to industry." 30 The council confirmed and justified encomienda in the Laws of Burgos, the first comprehensive code for the administration of the indigenous. Uniting salvation and physical labor, its preamble states, "by nature [the Indians] are inclined to idleness and vice, and have no manner of virtue or doctrine." 31 It ordered tasks, even for chiefs, so that "they may be occupied and not idle, thus avoiding the difficulties that might arise from idleness." 32 Furthermore, "the principal obstacle in the way of correcting their vices and having them profit by and impressing them with a doctrine is that their dwellings are remote from the settlements of the Spaniards"-the natives "immediately forget what they have been taught and go back to their customary idleness and vice." 33 As Foucault points out, "The first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and without limit." 34 This is followed by "supervisions, checks, inspections, and varied controls," a "series of techniques for the surveillance of individuals, the diagnosis of what they are, the classification of their mental structure." 35 Natives were relocated nearer to the Spaniards' civilizing influence, and their old dwellings were burnt. Churches were to be built in villages, relocated closer to their encomenderos; two inspectors would meticulously regulate and remold tribal culture according to Christian practices. 36 Children were baptized, and bells would summon the natives to pray three times a day. The encomendero was to teach his Indians "to cross themselves and bless themselves, and together recite" their prayers. 37 Food, clothes, and beds were to be provided. To curb promiscuity and sodomy, the indigenous were to be "persuaded to marry"; monogamous marriage was required for sexual union, and nakedness and dancing were prohibited. The sons of caciques would be entrusted to Franciscan missionaries for four years of intense education; all others were forced to serve individual Spaniards for nine months each year, and spend the remaining three months working on their own farms or for wages. One-third were sent to work, under inhumane conditions, in the mines. 38 A century before Foucault's Hôpital général, we find the ethical transcendence of labor over barbaric idleness: "as idleness had become the supreme form of revolt, the idle were forced into work, into the endless leisure of labour without utility or profit." 39 While industry was the basis for encomienda, it was also the rationale used by clergy fighting for humane treatment: If the indigenous could demonstrably discipline and govern themselves, then they could be freed from encomienda and accorded equal rights as tribute-paying subjects. The humanitarian movements, Foucault suggests, were protests against Enlightenment practices, yet within the same paradigm. Supported by the Crown, Las Casas, Bishop Juan de Zumárraga, and Bishop Vasco Quiroga planned experimental villages to discipline the indigenous. 40 The three experimenting mendicant orders often engaged in what Foucault called "counter-conduct," a revolt of ascetic orders against the mediocrity of secular clergy and bishops. 41 Jurisdictional battles ensued, with each side commanding loyalty from indigenous subordinates. 42 To "determine the capacity of the Indians," the reformers tested their ability to assimilate, in order to decide whether they were capable of living by themselves, or "politicamente," thus capable of legal freedoms. 43 The earliest social experiments concluded that only one Indian was capable, and the rest were placed in villages administered by officials and friars. Rodrigo de Figueroa's experiment in Hispaniola in 1520 failed when the indigenous, freed from encomienda and placed under Christian supervision in experimental villages, did not labor on their own, like "Christian laborers in Castile." 44 Gold production plummeted and the experiment was abandoned. Similar experiments failed in Puerto Rico and Cuba.
Las Casas came up with the alternative of colonization: "justice for the Indians," writes Lewis Hanke, "depended upon the systematic colonization of the New World by Spanish farmers" and the formation of "Spanish-Indian communities where Indians might absorb the Spanish way of life." 45 In Las Casas's most ambitious plans, the indigenous would live in towns and work in common; their workdays and leisure would be regimented, overseen by an army of salaried administrators who enforced strict regulations. 46 He wrote, "And if as time goes on the Indians should prove themselves able to live alone and govern themselves . . . in the same way as . . . other vassals do," they would receive the same legal freedoms. 47 Royal orders in 1518 promised "Privileges and Liberties . . . to Farmers who go to the Indies," as well as created villages of free indigenous living in an orderly "political way like Spaniards," paying tribute, and not given in encomienda. 48 In 1520, Charles granted land in Tierra Firma to Las Casas, who in return promised not only to pacify and convert the indigenous, but also to make them profitable. 49 In the 1530s, with a similar goal of teaching the indigenous to be "self-reliant and self-sufficient," Quiroga created experimental villages that included hospitals and the production and regulation of indigenous arts and crafts for commerce. 50 Noting that the indigenous were afflicted with "natural indolence," and thus lived in "chaos," he concluded: "There is no way of ordering them or of promoting good Christian life among them . . . except by bringing them to live together in well ordered communities." 51 There, "by working and tilling the soil, they may maintain themselves with their labor and may be ruled by . . . good and Catholic ordinances." 52 In each village, a house would be built "for two or three or four brothers," who would "not leave their task until such time as the natives may have acquired the habits of virtue and this has become part of their nature."
Rationality meant industry, and labor was the cure to irrationality. Failure to assimilate brought harsh repercussions. The Requerimiento of 1513, a legal document written by Rubios, rationalized both encomienda and just war. It was to be read to all natives by their Spanish conquerors. If the indigenous failed to accept Spanish rule:
We shall forcibly enter into your country and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and children, and shall make slaves of them, and . . . shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and . . . do all the harm and damage that we can.
The document explains the donation of Alexander VI and finds a legal loophole for just war: the indigenous could be declared infidels only after having been given the chance to deny the gospel. In a perfunctory legal ritual, it was read to vacant villages, trees, on the outskirts of towns, and without interpreters. In 1519, Cortés used it to conquer and convert those who violated the laws of nature. Whether labeled a natural slave or the free subject of the king, the native must work.
The Absolutization of Reason
Late scholastic thinkers played a role in what Foucault called the "banishment" of unreason by constructing an absolute reason in legal theory. 53 Responding to historical events, they denied the historicity mirrored in the barbaric Other and grounded rational and moral ideas on a universal, or absolute, human nature. The king had left Burgos concerned about the justice of his title, as well as his claim to the indigenous's labor, lands, and riches. Yet reports were returning from the Americas that under encomienda, the indigenous were being stripped of their possessions and forced to labor as slaves. Not only did this oppose the Crown's mission of conversion, it threatened Spain's territorial claim, which could be revoked by the papal power that had granted it. The Crown repeatedly turned to its theologians to resolve political questions on the identity of the indigenous and the legitimacy of the conquest.
Political necessity dictated that late scholastic jurists construct a legal justification of Spanish conquest. This reframing of the Thomistic theory of natural law, writes Luciano Pereña, was a conscious objective, a "reconverción" of thought transplanted from Salamanca, Evora, Coimbra, and Rome, to colleges in Mexico, Lima, and Bogota. 54 It was a complex task, for Aquinas himself did not include theoretical solutions to concrete problems of international relations; he did not understand natural law in such a way. Rather natural law was dialectical, requiring a dialogue, or quaestio, between seemingly contrary positions, for natural law was the rational participation in God's eternal law. The natural law was true speculatively, but it required the use of practical judgment in particulars. 55 Rosemann describes Thomistic thought as an incomplete circle, a discourse between the positive and negative aspects of God. Humans strive to know God in the realization that it is impossible to understand Him fully. The "closure of the circle," or reason "absolutized," began in late scholasticism as political pressures demanded a change in the quaestio. 56 Aquinas's dialectic in natural law became a closed legal theory, the law of nations.
A significant change in the quaestio began in the early 1500s with the introduction of the relectio, or "re-reading," into the university system. At the end of a session, the lecturer was required to give a special lecture on a problem encountered during the year's lectures. The most famous relectiones were those of Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1480-1546), Prime Professor of Theology at Salamanca, arguably the most influential theologian of his day, and the first to articulate a well-developed theory of the law of nations. Vitoria published little during his lifetime, but the work of his best pupil, Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), was first printed as De iustitia et iure in 1553. The 1556-57 edition, reprinted twenty-seven times by century's end, became "a standard manual on rights and justice which could have been found on the shelves of every scholarly library in Europe." 57 Vitoria's relectiones contributed to the development of legal theory by helping simplify the growing number of texts in existence. The exhausting comprehensiveness of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae helped to make it a work to be interpreted rather than debated. Although Vitoria recognized the value of theological disputation, he noted that the purpose of relectiones was not "to stir up fresh contentions," but to resolve ambiguities in philosophical texts to provide solutions to immediate problems. 58 In the first printing of Vitoria's Relectiones in 1557, Jacques Boyer, in his edit of the text, placed divisions before the final paragraphs of Vitoria's argument, so that the reader could find Vitoria's conclusion without having to work through his reasoning. 59 The most salient political issue during Vitoria's time was the Spanish conquest and the legal status of the indigenous, and Vitoria gave relectiones On the Power of the Church, On the American Indians, and On the Law of War. He commented, "And as far as I am aware, no theologian of note or worthy of respect in a matter of such importance has ever been called upon to study this question [of rule over the Indians] and provide a solution." 60 Vitoria's attempt to finalize such solutions in law required that he remove the ambiguities in Aquinas's teaching of natural law, modifying it to create a new law of nations.
Aquinas wrote that the natural law, "the participation in the eternal law by rational creatures," 61 was composed of two distinct parts: first principles, those known to all rational beings, and derivative principles, which are "conclusions following closely from the first principles." 62 These principles provided the rational foundations for all codified law. He wrote, "If, at any point, [human law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law." 63 Human laws then must be derived from the natural law, but "each political community decides on what is best for itself." 64 What is then by law natural, or in accordance with reason, is universal with regard to speculative activity, but not political activity, which always concerns the particulars, and as such is always changeable. 65 While Aquinas spoke of the "law of nations," he was referring to the similar regulations that all societies in some form adopt internally; for example, "the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way is not directly by natural law but is a certain determination of it." 66 Vitoria was the first theologian to take the human law consensus, which was the basis for the implementation of natural law, and create a universal positive law, founded on the consensus of all men in the world.
The law of nations does not have the force merely of pacts or agreements between men, but has the validity of a positive enactment. The whole world, which is in a sense a commonwealth, has the power to enact laws which are just and convenient to all men; and these make up the law of nations. 67 The law of nations was a set of universal precepts, irrespective of local laws or customs. While Aquinas explicitly distinguished the law of nations from the natural law, Vitoria taught that "the law of nations . . . either is or derives from natural law." 68 As to its principles, their "derivation from natural law is manifestly sufficient to enable it to enforce binding rights.
But even on the occasions when it is not derived from natural law, the consent of the greater part of the world is enough to make it binding, especially when it is for the common good of all men." 69 The law of nations would "have the force of law, even though the rest of mankind objected thereto." 70 Vitoria replied to the objection that the law of nations, lacking promulgation, could not be a proper law: "it is sufficient that it should be promulgated only amongst a certain number of men, that being sufficient to make it a law throughout the world." 71 Soto agreed that it was a kind of positive law "to be arrived at by a process of natural reasoning, but without any meeting of men and lengthy discussion." 72 If this law was breached, violating communities could be justly punished. 73 Despite Vitoria's and Soto's own criticisms of the conquest, the new legal framework resolved the Crown's most pressing problems. 74 First, Vitoria's law of nations provided a legal source of sovereignty. Vitoria and Soto denied that the Church possessed temporal authority over unbelievers, and instead grounded Spanish claims to American hegemony upon the state, and ius gentium, which were founded upon human reason. The law of nations allowed foreigners to travel through one another's domains, so long as they do no harm. 75 Any attempt to prohibit Spanish travel would "be inhumane and unreasonable, and therefore without the force of law." 76 The Spanish also could intervene and dethrone rulers, to rescue innocent people from "tyranny and oppression," either in a case of "true and voluntary election," such as requested aid against the Mexica, or in the case of cannibalism, whether the victims asked for aid or not. 77 Finally, said Vitoria, one might argue for a therapeutic occupation: as the natives were "so close to being mad," "for their own benefit the princes of Spain might take over their administration, and set up urban officers and governors on their behalf, or even give them new masters, so long as this could be proved to be in their interest." 78 As the indigenous had acted against natural law, the Crown might claim a right to charitably hold their lands until they proved capable of proper use. 79 But Vitoria's first innovation required a second. Claims to sovereignty, he warned, were not the same as dominium: one may protect innocent humans under the law of nations by "setting up Christian princes over them," but it did not confer "power to eject the enemy from their dominions and despoil them of their property." 80 Las Casas claimed that encomienda, which violated canon and civil law, threatened the just title of the Crown. In 1529, the Council of the Indies, already concerned to limit the power of the encomenderos, agreed that free subjects could not be given in forced labor. 81 While encomienda was not immediately dismantled, it faced increasing opposition. The 1537 papal bull Sublimis Deus declared that the indigenous had the "nature" and "faculties" to accept the faith. Consequently, they were "Not to be deprived of their liberty, or . . . property . . . nor should they be any way enslaved." Quoting the bull, Las Casas insisted that the conquest had been unjust; the theft of native gold, silver, and pearls demanded restitution; native subjects must receive full freedoms; and future conquests must cease. He advised Charles to "leave Peru to the Incas."
82 But Vitoria counseled Charles to keep conquered lands, "lest Christendom be lost there."
83 Once again, the Crown turned to Vitoria's legal theory to resolve the contradictions in its sanctioning of forced labor.
The law of nations provided a solution for Spanish dominium by constructing a legal philosophy of what Foucault called subjectivation, or the individuation of humans that altered their claims to ownership. 84 Vitoria rejected Aquinas's view of nature, in which rational humans existed on an instinctual continuum with animals, and inserted a break between the rational, with its dominium and thus moral culpability, from the animal, or physical. 85 Soto extended this dominium as a subjective right: created in God's image, man was rational and free, meaning he possessed "dominion over his actions," hence over the things of the world, which were created for his sake and which he may freely use, so long it did not conflict with the rightful claims of others. 86 Thus dominium is "the proper faculty and right in any thing, by which he can usurp for his own profit in any use whatsoever permitted by law." 87 According to "natural law," ownership conferred individual rights, such as donation and indiscriminate transfer. 88 Use, while different from dominium, was essential to it. One may "use" one's property, "to be given, sold, consumed, and alienated in whatever manner," 89 or one may be injured in the use of his faculties, reputation, and things. Rejecting the Roman legal claim of rights exclusive to civil society, the Dominicans affirmed natural individual rights, which informed human relations both in a natural state and in civil society. Vitoria could infer from communal property bad government: where "properties were owned in common, evil men or even thieves and misers would be the most favoured. They would put less and take more in the commonwealth." 90 Where land and produce are owned in common, wrote Soto, "Each worker will try to appropriate as many goods as possible, and given the way human beings desire riches, everyone will behave in the same fashion." 91 Vitoria and Soto also wished to limit the conditions under which liberty could be sold-there could be no dominium in Portuguese chattel slavery-and find a rational basis for indigenous claims to property.
But the recognition of the indigenous as legal persons also justified the deprivation of their lands under the law of nations. Earlier natural law theories included both communal and individual forms of ownership, but modern natural law rejected community property, or unused land, for a theory of private ownership based on labor or use. 92 The Spanish could not claim dominion by discovery if the land was already owned, but the land was not owned because it was not used. This contradiction is clear in Vitoria's writings, where he first rejects the Spanish claim to dominion by discovery: "The barbarians possessed true public and private dominion. The law of nations . . . expressly states that goods which belong to no owner pass to the occupier."
93 But, he adds, if the indigenous do not use their land, with its gold or pearls, according to the law of nations the Spanish may appropriate any materials they find: "If there are any things among the barbarians which are held in common both by their own people and by strangers, it is not lawful for the barbarians to prohibit the Spaniards from sharing and enjoying them." 94 Under the law of nations, he added, "a thing which does not belong to anyone becomes the property of the first taker." The Spanish also had the right to freely trade their acquisitions, "so long as they do no harm": "They may import the commodities which they lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance; and their princes cannot prevent their subjects from trading with the Spaniards, nor can the princes of Spain prohibit commerce with the barbarians." 95 Since all nations were bound together by these standards, Vitoria included free trade within and between Christian nations as part of international law. 96 The debate between Las Casas and Sepúlveda at Valladolid in 1550-51, presided over by Soto and Melchor Cano, and with inconclusive results, must be placed within the context of Soto's teaching of right under the law of nations. Soto agreed with Las Casas that "all the peoples of the world are men" and "may be converted to all political virtues," but he rejected Las Casas's appeal to papal donation. 97 Rather, he sought to ennoble the conquest by a system of natural law that would uphold the indigenous's rights to free labor and equal protection, as well as (correcting Vitoria) claims to a share, or "consent," in the gold that was mined from their lands. 98 Thus Soto never repudiated the Spanish claim to ius predicandi, and those fighting for indigenous property rights championed Las Casas. In 1552 both Mexican friars and Texcocans claimed, against the new titleholders, Las Casas's position of papal donation. 99 Licentiate Valderrama reported that the friars impeded the collection of tribute by publicly stating and preaching that the pope had conceded the land to the king only for their spiritual good: once they became Christians the king was obliged to leave.
Many wrote to refute Las Casas, and Vitoria's arguments were used to defend the Spanish conquest and dominion in Mexico, Peru, and the Philippines. 100 Francisco de Toledo suppressed Las Casas's writings and funded his own, which defended the Spanish title to Peru: The Spanish were invited to free the Incas from tyranny, cruelty, and violations of the law of nature, such as cannibalism and human sacrifice, which negated the Incas' title and dominion. Pedro Sarmiento's History of the Incas, pointing to "Francisco de Vitoria in his work on the title to the Indies," concluded that the Crown had "legitimate right to the Indies" because those in the discovered lands had violated "the law of nature." 101 The Spanish claimed to rule for the good of the people, bringing trade and agricultural techniques. The town council of Cuzco pointed to the monasteries and hospitals it had erected. Regarding dominion, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, citing Vitoria, justified the acquisition, under natural right, as "este premíoá la industria"; Gregorio Lopez claimed it was "el premio de sus trabajos."
The final transition to what Foucault called an "absolutist theory of raison d'État" is from "normation" in a space of discipline to "normalization in the strict sense" and governmentality. 103 The latter requires "the emergence of mankind as a species," making possible the study of "naturalness," and the transition from natural law as a concept of sovereignty to the study of population moved by common desire, susceptible to government technique. 104 To this end, the Jesuits constructed new theories of the individual and the state. 105 First, they rejected the Dominicans' distinction between subjective dominium and instinct for that between physical nature and moral nature: between acting freely and acting rightly, or nature elevated to the status of objective reason. 106 Thus they altered the idea of subjective right, including dominium over one's actions and property, to mean prepositive rights always expressed through contract under civil law to reward individual industry and merit. 107 Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) theorized that private property, plucked fruit, even cultivated land, were not the result of sin, and may have existed before the Fall. 108 He grounded the political order on consent: a community confers power to an authority for ends limited by natural law. 109 Second, in their analyses of the nature of things, the Jesuits freed the study of man's natural desires in relation to law and economy and introduced what the physiocrats called "physical processes." 110 Leonardus Lessius (1554-1623) wrote, "Natural law derives its existence from the very nature of things, that is from rational nature and the natural condition underlying the deeds this law regulates." 111 The new political economy, writes Foucault, was indispensable for the conception of "security," which does not enclose for discipline, but "lets things happen": that which is not forbidden is allowed. 112 In their study of natural processes, the Jesuits developed theories of interest, price, contracts, liability, money, and wages, and ultimately techniques for predicting relations of desire to advance social utility. 113 Giovanni Botero united the idea of the state removed from princely fiat with principles of nature that supplied neutral methods for growth. 114 He defined a city and its greatness by its population, or "number of inhabitants and their power": drawn together not only by force, but "by pleasure" and "profit," he recommended a policy of "exemptions and freedoms" for their "encrease." 115 In 1571, Tomás de Mercado attached the positive benefits of private property to natural desire in self-love. Common ownership was counterproductive "because one loves nothing more than the things he owns." 116 He continued: "If a father loves his children, it is because they are his: If a wife loves her husband it is because he belongs to her and she to him. . . . Love always inseparably involves the word 'mine': and the concept of property is basic to its nature and essence." The theoretical state of nature coincided with the natural communal state in the Americas: a state of scarcity, to be overcome by releasing individual desires. Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) observed, "Scarcity can be overcome through mutual exchange of those items owned in abundance by one party or the other." 117 "Nothing induces action," he wrote, "more than one's own utility, be the man a prince or a citizen." 118 The concept of the communal good was reintroduced in the theory of efficient use: a study of natural desires, even self-interest, with the proper legal hedges, could be directed to benefit the community. 119 Mercado severed ties between the common good and community property:
We cannot find a person who does not favor his own interests: and who does not prefer to provide more for his home, than the republic. We can see that privately owned property flourishes, things move forward and grow: while city and council property is ill-provided for and worse governed. . . . If universal love will not move people to value things, private interest will. 120 Private property was more efficient in its results to communal ownership; indeed, to deny it was heretical. 121 According to Mariana and Dominican Bartolomé de Albornoz (1519-1573), even mendicant priests should subscribe to private property, which best comported with human desire. 122 The poverty of the commune reflected both the scarcity of man's natural state and the need for its division into private property. Thus the Jesuits' own experimental villages, formed to protect indigenous property and rights, combined modes of pastoral discipline with new theories of economic planning. 123 But in the Americas, even if the indigenous used the land, their inefficient use nullified their property claims.
Discipline and Governmentality in Latin America
Foucault described how the absolute conception of reason provides a table for bodies of knowledge. "The 'regime' of truth," he wrote, "is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism." 124 In the arts of governing the state and its populations, "the major form of knowledge" is political economy. 125 Governmentality is also the "process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 'governmentalized.'" 126 However, Foucault's own methods call into question his history of the law of nations. He argued that raison d'État took form in opposition to Spain's empire and the Church, by "enemies and rivals" that developed theories of state competition versus empire; separate churches versus the Church; mercantilist, and later physiocratic, economies versus princely wealth. 127 Rather, governmentality developed out of the Spanish confrontation with the indigenous Other: removing imperium from the Church; disciplining and subjectivizing laborers; building towns for circulation of wealth and populations. 128 Thus we conclude by showing the emergence of Foucault's three supports of governmentality in Latin America: Christian pastoral discipline, police, and diplomacy. 129 The assimilation of the indigenous as moral and legal subjects, by the Church and the courts, meant their transition in legal status to free laborers, stripped of traditional property rights and managed as a population for production. Civil government under the king, or corregimiento, was established in the 1520s-30s, and early on began to limit the encomenderos' rights to indigenous labor. 130 The 1542 New Laws, approved by both Charles and the Council of the Indies, was an experiment to do away with encomienda. 131 Thousands of natives who had been "enslaved against all reason and right" became legally free persons, subjects of the "Crown of Castile," or "Crown Indians": they were only forced to labor for the Crown if necessary, and received greater care for life and health. The Crown shaped political and religious districts, and built a system of towns for the circulation of metals and commodities, as well as displaced natives. The towns were also structured as a space for the supervision of people. 132 Spanish colonialism was most effective in its cultural hegemony, whose techniques, Susan Kellogg writes, are "subtler . . . more pervasive forms of social control" because they "appear to be self-regulating." 133 The Church solidified its power, both positive, in increasing levels of discipline, and negative, in defending its parishioners' rights in court.
The Church's pastoral care over "souls and lives," especially the family, required greater levels of discipline. 134 The regular and secular clergy divided the colony into jurisdictions, supported by parishioners' labor, tithes, and alms. Clerics were ordered to compile census data; hear and record confirmation of confessions, mass attendance, and alms-giving; instruct parishioners and observe their conduct; and report on the convocation of children, and the possible resistance of their parents. 135 Priests attacked polygynous marriages with Catholic teachings on the family, and inquired into sexual practices in confessionals to stamp out concubinage. 136 Penalties included whippings, jail, torture, exile into monasteries, and even execution. When accused by royal officers of intrusion, Franciscans responded that the Indians "want[ed] to be disciplined." 137 While the Church exercised supernatural sanction, which undergirded the authority of the law, judges were encouraged to allow or defer to native traditions that did not conflict with Christianity. 138 Thus, in what Foucault calls an "adjustment between political power wielded over legal subjects and pastoral power wielded over live individuals," the subjectivized individual, disciplined by the Church, was separated from the indigenous community and freed into legal channels of control. 139 Because the Castilian legal system was a "hodgepodge of confused laws and competing jurisdictions that crafty litigants exploited to their own advantage," Spanish legal theory played an important role. 140 Oidores had the highest degrees in law, and juridical texts, such as Pereira's Politica Indiana, cited theorists like Vitoria, Soto, and Suarez. The Real Audiencia was free to rule according to royal law or local custom. As Kellogg notes, reliance on Spanish courts to resolve claims to justice blended Spanish and Mexican values and practices, but it also "perpetuat[ed] Spanish rule by defusing and channeling dissent," thereby eroding "social collectivitiesespecially supracommunity institutions-that might have . . . challeng [ed] Spanish cultural identity." 141 The courts promoted Spanish values of "privatization of property, the primacy of the nuclear family, and the growth of male privilege."
142 With the indigenous recognized as legal persons, juridical victories solidified the conquerors' system of political economy.
Courts translated native customs involving property and family relations, such as inheritance, into Spanish legal terms, eliminating cultural concepts: for example, the definition of the word "house" shifted from "multiple-family residence" to "nuclear residence patterns"-from a cognatic kinship, descent through either male or female formed around sibling and intergenerational ties, toward patrifilial, hierarchically ranked, and gender-defined domains. 143 The more time that passed since the conquest, the less litigants argued their claims to ownership based on customary indigenous rights. By 1585, kin-based transmission had been replaced by purchase or grant. 144 Mexican claims to property, in which ownership was shared at various levels, were rejected for unitary, expansive, and precise legal ownership. 145 Generally, under Aztec rule, inalienable private property was bound to the offices of the ruler and highest nobles. All other property was tied in one way or another to some form of corporation or body of people. At the community (ward) level, land was possessed by the ward members. "Calpulli (ward) members enjoyed individual, inheritable, usufruct rights to certain individual plots of land, but could not alienate calpullali [land of the town] from their calpulli." 146 Palaces, which were administrative and religious centers, also possessed lands as a corporation, to which a class of laborers, receiving special status, was attached. Ward members, besides laboring for their own subsistence, were required to give tribute and provide labor to their lord. 147 There existed distinct forms of land tenure that gave multiple groups of people, both male and female, rights to the same plots of land. 148 While both Spanish and American cultures had recognized communally owned property, the Crown had an interest in controlling as much of the new territory as possible, and not entailing it to the encomenderos. 149 Originally the Crown issued estancias, or permits (not grants of ownership) to build pens for cattle and sheep, to Spanish applicants. Yet after 1535 viceregal authorities extended legal recognition to occupation of pasture in the merced, or land grant. 150 According to Francois Chevalier, "By fixing limits and indicating the recipients' rights and duties, the new estancia deeds tended to clarify and circumscribe the raisers' gradual taking over of the land." 151 The taking of indigenous property was legally justified because use became both the decisive criteria for ownership and the legal right of the owner abstracted from indigenous communities. In a 1533 report to Charles V, the council suggested that the indigenous be allowed to keep their lands if they showed disposition to cultivate them. But, Chevalier writes, "Generally the land requested was not being used. Around 1567, the Viceroy, the Marqués de Falces, seized the opportunity to force the Indians to choose between two alternatives: exploiting and stocking a given plot within a definite period of time (three to six months) or letting it go by default to Spanish petitioners." 152 In some areas, such as central Mexico, much of the land could only be used by cattle herders. Moreover, the indigenous often did not use the land even when offered legal protections. Having a different conception of property, they hastily exercised their rights to sell it for small sums, and the land was swallowed up by Spanish settlers.
Considering use, the estancia, a title to use land for a specific purpose, was replaced by the land grant, a private right to use land as one pleased. With the rise of the export cattle industry, the viceroy began to grant official titles, with rudimentary property rights, to the land in 1540. One grant stated: "I ordain that the estancia . . . shall belong to you and your heirs, successors, and assigns . . . and that you shall have the right to sell, give, or relinquish it to whomever you will." 153 Land grants were rapidly issued, with or without official royal approval, and subject to speculation. The privatization of land changed the shape of the estancia. Originally, it was a permit to land in the shape of a circle, its pen in the middle and its boundary overlapping with others. It gradually developed angular boundaries, so that land in between could be used more efficiently, or, wrote Martín Enríquez in 1571, "without intervening spaces of wasted land." 154 Stockmen wished to lay exclusive claim to specific plots of grazing land, and local authorities often sanctioned their squatting. Municipal councils granted titles after the land was settled, or based on sham purchases from indigenous residents. 155 In what Chevalier calls "a thorough transformation of land rights," the private owner had the right to choose how and for what purposes the land would be used or sold: "We may safely assume therefore that true property rights had taken the place of the original usufruct rights. . . . The old notion of grazing lands held in common had vanished without a trace." 156 By the 1600s, mercedes were often accompanied by a license for immediate sale of the land received. 157 In towns, litigation over sites started to ignore the houses themselves, and focused on the ground on which they were built-ownership rights, with power to sell, replaced residence rights. 158 Just as communal land rights were replaced by private ownership, a legal regime of tribute and wage labor replaced encomienda (following, as Foucault points out, the circulation of grain). 159 Agricultural production was for the sake of mining, and yet the greatest resource for Spain was the race-based labor system. The New Laws promised to set free some 200,000 Indian slaves, on whose labor the Crown and the Church depended. 160 The high levels of tribute had early on induced the indigenous into a system of trade, in which they, seeing the effects of inflation, requested to pay tribute in money. But the decimation of indigenous laborers brought economic crisis. Following the epidemic of 1545-48, which killed up to a third of the indigenous population, the king issued a cédula prohibiting payment of encomienda tribute in labor. He instituted the repartimiento system, a labor draft, and extended collection of a head tax to the whole Indian population under corregimiento. Judges increased "cuatequil or the system of forced wage labour" to meet growing labor shortages; they also raised working and nutritional standards as the labor supply decreased, as well as wages (though below market levels). 161 In congregación, large numbers of the Indian population were resettled, usually to worse land, for the purpose of providing labor; this went hand in hand with the sale of land to Spanish holders for commercial production.
The emancipation of individuals as legal persons was inseparable from exploitation of their labor. Simpson writes, "It was wrong to enslave the innocent heathen, as . . . Vitoria had long since pointed out, but it must be remembered that only free Indians paid tribute," and the "pious motive of the emancipation" must be connected to "the prospect of recovering tribute from ex-slaves." 162 A 1551 cédula recognized, "In several parts of our Indies there were some natives who had no pueblos in which to live together and, hence, had no territory in which tribute might be collected." 163 The freeing and resettlement of Indians required administration, and for such tasks the Crown sent bureaucrats to "make proper provision for their good treatment and fair wages." 164 The communities of freedmen, based on free labor, were placed under the tutelage of the Spanish estancieros and friars. Tribute was increased and extended to those previously exempt in the early colonial period. The most profitable sectors of mining, manufacture, and large-scale commerce (wheat, cattle, sugar, and indigo) were held by the Spanish, while the indigenous grew maize to supply cities and mining camps. After 1575, following economic depression in Spain, the decline in laborers and mining output, and the growth of cities, the hacienda system integrated the dual Spanish and Indian economic sectors into a single Mexican economy, with a land-owning hacendado class relying on "free" gañán labor and the consolidation of indigenous communities. 165 The irrational Other remained in a racial caste system.
The law of nations accompanied state colonialist competition. Fernando Vázquez argued that just as the Portuguese could not wage just war on natural slaves, no nation held jurisdiction over the waters: Spain could ignore the papal grant to Portugal in the Pacific, cut into the trade with the East, and settle the Philippines, where, citing Vitoria, Miguel López de Legaspi established requerimiento in 1559. 166 In 1566 a new order permitted viceroys to issue licenses for discovery, followed by war in 1570, with similar reports of Spanish cruelty. One 1573 report stated, "It is considered just cause for war in the War Council if the natives say that they do not care for the friendship of the Spaniards." 167 Philip II's Ordinance of 1573 banned slavery under "natural law": the indigenous would be freed by their increased right to acquire and trade property, as well as by the forceful suppression of their vices. The same year Albornoz included in the law of nations free trade and contracts, which were themselves "immutable," not subject to the irregularities of civil law. 168 The conquest extended to the
